A costume doesn't fool a fingerprint
Clearing cookies is like taking off a name tag at a Halloween party. A browser fingerprint recognizes the walk instead. Here is what a fingerprint reads, why it ignores a Decline, how browsers push back, and how the fingerprint lab shows it without keeping anything.
Halloween week is a good time to talk about disguises. A visitor who clears cookies has taken off the name tag. The next page load has no _ga, no bbp.visitor, nothing to say "you were here before." A fingerprint does not need the name tag. It looks at the costume, the height, and the way you walk, and it can still guess who came back.
The fingerprint lab computes the traits a fingerprint could use, right in your tab, and then throws them away. This post explains what those rows mean, why this site refuses to use them, and what browsers now do about it.
Name tag versus walk
A cookie is state. The site writes a value, the browser stores it, and the browser sends it back. The cookies lab lists every one this site sets. Clear site data and that state is gone. That is the control people expect to have.
A fingerprint is stateless. Nothing is written. The site reads things the browser already exposes and combines them into a value that tends to stay the same from visit to visit. The W3C note Mitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications splits this into two kinds:
- Passive fingerprinting uses what arrives with every request, with no code on the page: HTTP headers like the User-Agent, the IP address, and other network details. The note says that for some populations the User-Agent and IP address together will often uniquely identify a browser.
- Active fingerprinting runs JavaScript or CSS in the page to read more: window size, fonts, connected devices, performance, sensors, and how graphics render. The note points out that active techniques are at least potentially detectable on the client, while passive ones are not.
So the walk is made of many small traits. None of them is a name. Together they can act like one.
What the lab reads
Open the fingerprint lab and you get seven rows, all computed in the page:
- Screen.
screen.widthbyscreen.height. - Color depth.
screen.colorDepth. - Time zone. From
Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().timeZone. - Languages.
navigator.languages, in your preferred order. - hardwareConcurrency. The number of logical processors the browser reports.
- Font sample. Seven common faces (Arial, Courier New, Georgia, Times New Roman, Verdana, Trebuchet MS, Comic Sans MS). Each is measured on a canvas against monospace, and a face is listed when its width differs. It is a sample, not your full font list.
- Canvas hash. The page draws a small dark box with the words "open box" and an arc, exports it with
toDataURL(), and shows the first 16 hex characters of a SHA-256 digest. Different GPUs, drivers, and font rendering can produce slightly different pixels, so the hash can differ between machines that otherwise look alike.
Canvas readback as a tracking signal goes back to the 2012 paper Pixel Perfect by Keaton Mowery and Hovav Shacham, which showed that text and WebGL rendering differ enough between systems to fingerprint them.
None of these rows is secret. The risk comes from combining them.
How unique is a costume?
The classic measurement is the EFF's How Unique Is Your Web Browser? by Peter Eckersley. In a sample of 470,161 browsers from privacy-aware volunteers, 83.6% had an instantaneously unique fingerprint. The paper notes the sample was biased toward people who cared about privacy.
A larger, later study pulled the number down. Hiding in the Crowd (Gómez-Boix, Laperdrix, and Baudry, The Web Conference 2018) collected 2,067,942 fingerprints from one of the top 15 French websites and found only 33.6% were unique. The authors also found that non-unique fingerprints are fragile: change a few features and the browser often becomes unique again. They credit the removal of plugins for a big drop in unique desktop machines.
That is the honest picture. Plenty of people show up in the same store-bought costume, and a fingerprint cannot always tell them apart. But "sometimes in a crowd" is not the same as "anonymous," and a site that fingerprints does not get to choose which visitors it can single out.
Why Decline has to mean decline
Here is the part that matters for anyone running collection. A visitor who clicks Decline, or clears cookies, is making a choice about being recognized. A fingerprint keeps recognizing them anyway, because nothing was stored for them to clear.
The UK regulator said so plainly. When Google announced that from 16 February 2025 its advertising customers would no longer be prohibited from fingerprinting, the ICO responded that fingerprinting "is not a fair means of tracking users online because it is likely to reduce people's choice and control over how their information is collected." It added that PECR and data protection law still apply, that businesses must give users fair choices, including consent where necessary, and that for advertising this "is a high bar to meet."
So this site keeps the name tag and skips the walk. The lab's own panel says it: the anonymous id is the bbp.visitor cookie, written only when a consented beacon runs and deleted when you clear cookies. The traits in the lab are not written to storage, not pushed to the dataLayer, and not posted to an API. With consent on, the lab sends one fingerprint_view event with no parameters, so the page view counts but none of the traits leave your tab. You can check the consent side in the consent lab and the stored keys in the storage lab.
Browsers are handing out masks
Browser makers are not waiting for every site to behave.
- Safari. WebKit's Safari 26.0 features post says Safari now prevents known fingerprinting scripts from reliably reading APIs that reveal device characteristics, including screen dimensions, hardware concurrency, speech synthesis voices, web audio readback, and 2D canvas. It also stops those scripts from setting long-lived script-written storage and from reading query parameters and
document.referrer. Note the word "known": the rules target scripts Safari classifies as fingerprinting, not every page. - Firefox. Mozilla describes its expanded fingerprinting protections, which cover more APIs in Private Browsing and in Enhanced Tracking Protection's Strict mode.
The W3C note names two of the goals in holiday terms, if you squint: a "decreased fingerprinting surface" means fewer costume details to notice, and an "increased anonymity set" means more people in the same costume.
Try it
- Open the fingerprint lab in Chrome and write down the canvas hash and font sample.
- Clear site data and reload. The cookies are gone, and the cookies lab shows it. The fingerprint rows come back the same, because nothing about the walk changed.
- Open the lab in a private Firefox window or in Safari and compare. Whether the values change depends on the browser, its settings, and whether it treats the script as a fingerprinter, so treat any difference as a hint, not a measurement.
- Resize the window or change your language list and reload. The screen and languages rows move, which is the fragility the 2018 study describes.
The takeaway for anyone building collection: the browser already tells you plenty, and you do not need a disguise-proof id to understand visitors. Ask for consent, store a first-party id the visitor can clear, and let a cleared name tag mean what the visitor meant by it. Happy Halloween.
Sources
- Mitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications, W3C
- How Unique Is Your Web Browser?, Peter Eckersley, EFF
- Hiding in the Crowd: an Analysis of the Effectiveness of Browser Fingerprinting at Large Scale, ACM
- Pixel Perfect: Fingerprinting Canvas in HTML5, Mowery and Shacham
- Our response to Google's policy change on fingerprinting, ICO
- WebKit Features in Safari 26.0, WebKit
- Firefox expands fingerprint protections, Mozilla
Labs that show this
- What a fingerprint could see
What a fingerprint could see without cookies: traits calculated in this tab and not stored. A free reading of the browser, dropped when you close the page.
- Cookies, storage, and consent
Cookies, storage, and consent on this origin: who owns each key, how long it lasts, and which services are not cookies. Free, and Speed Insights sets none.
- Consent Mode and Global Privacy
Consent Mode and Global Privacy Control on this site: what is sent before Accept, what changes after, and how a GPC signal keeps measurement off.
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